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Abstract
Proof-of-work (PoW) is one of the most common techniques to
defend against Sybil attacks. Unfortunately, current PoW defenses
have two main drawbacks. First, they require work to be done even in
the absence of attack. Second, during an attack, they require the good
identities (IDs) to spend as much as the attacker.
Recent theoretical work by Gupta, Saia and Young suggests the
possibility of overcoming these two drawbacks. In particular, they
describe a new algorithm, GMCom, that always ensures that a minority
of IDs are Sybil. They show that rate at which all good IDs perform
computation is O(JG+
√
T (JG + 1)), where JG is the join rate of good
IDs, and T is the rate at which the adversary performs computation.
Unfortunately, this cost bound only holds in the case where (1) GM-
Com always knows the join rate of good IDs; and (2) there is a fixed
constant amount of time that separates join events by good IDs. Here,
we present ToGCom, which removes these two shortcomings. To do
so, we design and analyze a mechanism for estimating the join rate of
good IDs; and also devise a new method for setting the computational
cost to join the system. Additionally, we evaluate the performance of
ToGCom alongside prior PoW-based defenses. Based on our exper-
iments, we design heuristics that further improve the performance of
ToGCom by up to 3 orders of magnitude over these previous Sybil
defenses.
∗This work is supported by the National Science Foundation grants CNS-1318880 and
CCF-1320994.
†This work is supported by the National Science Foundation grant CCF 1613772 and
by a research gift from C Spire.
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1 Introduction
A Sybil attack occurs when a single adversary pretends to be multiple
identities (IDs) [10]. One of the oldest defenses against Sybil attacks is
proof-of-work (PoW) [11], in which any ID that wishes to use network
resources or participate in group decision-making must first perform some
work, typically solving computational puzzles.
PoW defends against any resource-bounded adversary. Thus, it is broadly
applicable, in contrast to approaches relying on domain-specific attributes,
such as social-network topology, multi-channel wireless communication, or
device locality.
Unfortunately, a significant drawback of PoW defenses is “the work".
In particular, current PoW approaches have significant computational over-
head, given that puzzles must always be solved, even when the system is
not under attack. This non-stop resource burning translates into a sub-
stantial energy and, ultimately, a monetary cost [7, 31, 32]. Consequently,
PoW approaches are used primarily in applications where participants have
a financial incentive to continually perform work, such as Bitcoin [38], and
other blockchain technologies [5,27]. This is despite numerous proposals for
PoW-based defenses in other domains [6, 12, 19,24,26,30,43,51,52].
Recently, Gupta et al. [21] described an algorithm, GMCom, that ad-
dresses this drawback. Let an ID be called bad if it is controlled by the Sybil
adversary, and good otherwise. GMCom ensures that a minority of IDs are
bad, and that good IDs spend in total asymptotically less than the adversary.
In particular, define the spend rate as the computational cost over all good
IDs per second, where this cost is due to solving puzzles. Then, GMCom
ensures the algorithm spend rate is O(JG +
√
T (JG + 1)), where JG is the
join rate of good IDs, and T is the adversary’s spend rate. A lower-bound
is given showing that this spend rate is asymptotically optimal [21]. This
defense is called asymmetric since the algorithm’s spend rate is sublinear
in T .
Unfortunately, this spend rate only holds in the case where (1) GMCom
always knows the join rate of good IDs; and (2) there is a fixed constant
amount of time that separates all join events by good IDs. We illustrate
the shortcoming of GMCom’s (incorrect) join-rate estimate in Section 4.2,
and the effect of arbitrarily-close join events can have on GMCom in Ap-
pendix A.3.
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1.1 Our Contributions
We introduce a new algorithmTotal over Good Computation (ToGCom).1
LikeGMCom, ToGCommaintains the following two invariants, which limit
the Sybil adversary’s ability to monopolize resources and control the network.
• Population Invariant : The fraction of bad IDs in the system is always
less than 1/6.
• Committee Invariant : There is always a committee , of size logarith-
mic in the current system size, known to all good IDs, that contains less
than a 1/2-fraction of bad IDs.2
Additionally, we make the following new contributions.
1. ToGCom spends at a rate of O(JG +
√
T (JG + 1)), even (1) without
always knowing the join rate of good IDs; and (2) when there is no lower
bound on the time between join events of good IDs.
2. We simplify and reduce from 4 to 2 the number of assumptions on the
behavior of good IDs that are needed for our analysis.
3. We empirically compare ToGCom against prior PoW defenses using real-
world data from several networks. ToGCom performs up to 2 orders of
magnitude better than previous defenses, according to our simulations
(Section 4.2).
4. Using insights from our first experiments, we engineer and evaluate several
heuristics aimed at further improving the performance of ToGCom. Our
best heuristic performs up to 3 orders of magnitude better than previous
algorithms for large-scale attacks (Section 4.3).
1.2 The General Network Model
We now describe a general network model that aligns with many permission-
less systems, including the work in [21].
Puzzles. IDs can construct computational puzzles of varying hardness,
whose solutions cannot be stolen or pre-computed. A k-hard puzzle for
any integer k ≥ 1 imposes a computational cost of k on the puzzle solver.
These are common assumptions in PoW systems [3, 26,38].
1So named since computational cost to join is proportional to total join rate over good
join rate (See Section 2.1).
2These constants can be can be made smaller, up to < α, at a cost of increasing the
hidden constants in our resource costs.
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Communication. All communication among good IDs uses a broadcast
primitive,Diffuse, which allows a good ID to send a value to all other good
IDs within a known and bounded amount of time, despite an adversary. Such
a primitive is a standard assumption in PoW schemes [4, 14, 16, 29]; see [33]
for empirical justification.
When a message is diffused in the network, it is not possible to determine
which ID initiated the diffusion of that message. Good IDs have digital
signatures, and each message originating at a good ID is signed by its private
key; we note that no public key infrastructure is assumed.
A round is the amount of time it takes to solve a 1-hard puzzle plus the
(shorter) time to diffuse the solution to the rest of the network.3 All IDs are
assumed to be synchronized.
Adversary. A single adversary controls all bad IDs. This pessimistically
represents perfect collusion and coordination by the bad IDs. Bad IDs may
arbitrarily deviate from our protocol, including sending incorrect or spurious
messages. The adversary can send messages to any ID at will, and can read
the messages diffused by good IDs before sending its own. It knows when
good IDs join and depart, but it does not know the private bits of any good
ID.
The adversary controls an α-fraction of computational power, where α >
0 is a small constant. That is, in a single round where all IDs are solving
puzzles, the adversary can solve an α-fraction of the puzzles; this is common
in past PoW literature [3, 16,38,49].
Joins and Departures. At most a constant fraction of the good IDs join
or depart in any round. Departing good IDs announce their departure to
the network. In practice, each good ID can issue “heartbeat messages” that
are periodically diffused and indicate to the committee that this ID is still
alive.
The minimum number of good IDs in the system at any point is assumed
to be at least n0. The system lifetime is defined to be the duration over
which nγ0 joins and departures occur, for any fixed constant γ > 0.
2 Our Algorithm - ToGCom
We begin by describing our algorithm, ToGCom, highlighting our new
method for setting puzzle hardness. Next, we develop intuition for why this
method yields the asymmetric property, and how it relies on a robust esti-
mate of the good join rate. This motivates the use of Estimate-GoodJR
as another critical component in our algorithm design.
3Communication latency in Bitcoin is 12 seconds; puzzle solving time is 10 minutes [8]
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Total over Good Computation (ToGCom)
Key Variables
i : iteration number
nai : number of IDs joining since beginning of iteration i
ndi : number of IDs departing since beginning of iteration i
Si : set of IDs at end of iteration i
Scur : current set of IDs in system
Initialization
i← 1
S0 ← set of IDs returned by initialization phase
S˜ ← S0
J˜G0 ← obtained in initialization phase
Execution
The committee maintains all variables above and makes all decisions using
Byzantine Consensus, including those used in Estimate-GoodJR, which is
run continuously. For each iteration i, do:
1. Each joining ID solves and diffuses the solution to an entrance puzzle of
difficulty equal to the number of IDs that have joined in the last 1/J˜Gi
seconds of the current iteration, including the newly joining ID.
2. When nai + ndi ≥ (1/11)|Si−1|, do:
Perform Purge
(a) The committee generates and diffuses a random string r to be used in
puzzles for this purge and entrance for the next iteration.
(b) Si ← set of IDs returning difficulty 1 puzzle solutions within 1 round.
(c) The committee selects a new committee of size Θ(logn0) from Si and
sends out this information via Diffuse.
(d) i← i+ 1.
Estimate-GoodJR
(e) S˜ ← most recent membership ensuring|Scur − S˜| ≥ (3/5)|Scur|.
(f) ˜`← length of time between last two changes of variable S˜.
(g) J˜Gi ← |Scur|/˜`
Figure 1: Pseudocode for ToGCom.
2.1 Overview of ToGCom
We describe ToGCom while referencing its pseudocode in Figure 1. ToG-
Com differs critically from GMCom in two ways: (1) the method for calcu-
lating the difficulty of puzzles assigned to joining IDs, and (2) the estimation
of the good join rate. The first change handles problems that may arise when
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good join events occur arbitrarily close together (see Section A.3). The sec-
ond enables a constant-factor estimate of the good join rate as shown in
Section 2.3. These two changes are highlighted in the pseudocode.
Execution occurs over disjoint periods of time called iterations, and
each iteration i ≥ 1 consists of Steps 1 and 2.
In Step 1, each joining ID must solve an entrance puzzle of difficulty
1 plus the number of IDs that join within the last 1/J˜Gi seconds where J˜
G
i
is the estimate of the join rate of good IDs for iteration i using Estimate-
GoodJR. This entrance cost approximates the ratio of the total join rate
over the good join rate, which motivates the name Total over Good
Computation.
Step 1 lasts until the earliest point in time when the number of IDs that
join in iteration i, nai , plus the number of IDs that depart in iteration i,
ndi , is at least (1/11)|Si−1|. The quantities nai and ndi are tracked by the
committee.
When Step 1 ends, a purge is performed by the committee by issuing a
1-hard puzzle via Diffuse in Step 2(a). In Step 2(b), each ID must respond
with a valid solution within 1 round. The committee removes unresponsive or
late-responding IDs from its whitelist, which is maintained using Byzantine
consensus amongst the committee members.
The current committee then selects Θ(log n0) IDs uniformly at random
from Si in Step 2(c). The committee uses Diffuse to inform Si that the
selected IDs are the new committee for iteration i + 1. All messages from
committee members are verified via public key digital signatures. This only
requires that all IDs know the digital signatures of the Θ(log n0) good com-
mittee members. This information is diffused in Step 2(c); we omit this
detail in Figure 1 for ease of presentation. Since the committee has a good
majority and coordinates its actions via Byzantine consensus, no public-key
infrastructure is required.
The remainder of Step 2 consists of Estimate-GoodJR, our new pro-
cedure for estimating the good-ID join rate. This estimate is computed in
Step 2(g), and used for setting the entrance cost. In Section 2.3, we give a
detailed description of Estimate-GoodJR; its proof of correctness is given
in Section A.1.
Finally, system initialization is achieved by solving theGenID problem,
where there is a set of good IDs, and an adversary with an α-fraction of
computational power who controls bad IDs. All good IDs must agree on a
set of IDs that contains (1) all good IDs, and (2) at most an α-fraction of bad
IDs. Solving GenID is a heavy-weight operation, but GMCom does this
only once at system initialization. A number of algorithms exist for solving
6
GenID [3, 22].
2.2 Developing Intuition for the Asymmetric Property
Initially, the asymmetric result may be surprising, and so we offer intuition
for this. Consider iteration i. In the absence of an attack, the entrance cost
should be proportional to the good join rate. This is indeed the case since
the puzzle difficulty is O(1) corresponding to the number of (good) IDs that
join within the last 1/J˜Gi ≈ 1/JGi seconds.
In contrast, if there is a large attack, then the entrance-cost function
imposes a significant cost on the adversary. Consider the case where a batch
of many bad IDs is rapidly injected into the system. This drives up the
entrance cost since the number of IDs joining within 1/J˜Gi seconds increases.
More precisely, assume the adversary’s spending rate is T = ξJalli , where
ξ is the entrance cost, and J alli is the join rate for all IDs. For the good IDs,
the spending rate due to the entrance cost is ξJGi , and the spending rate
due to the purge cost is Jalli . Setting these to be equal, and solving for ξ,
we get ξ = Jalli /J
G
i ; in other words, the number of IDs that have joined over
the last 1/JGi seconds. This is the entrance cost function that best balances
entrance and purge costs.
Spending rate of good IDs due to the entrance costs and purge costs is:
ξJGi + J
all
i ≤ 2Jalli = 2
√
(Jalli )
2 = 2
√
Jalli ξJ
G
i = 2
√
JGi T ,
where the first inequality holds by our setting of ξ, the third step since
Jalli = ξJ
G
i , and the final step since T = ξJ
all
i . This informal analysis shows
how knowledge of the good join rate can be used to reduce the algorithmic
spend rate.
2.3 Estimate-GoodJR
Given the above intuition, a method for estimating JGi is needed. However,
good IDs cannot be discerned from bad IDs upon entering the system, and
so the adversary may inject bad IDs in an attempt to obscure the true join
rate of good IDs. Designing a robust procedure for obtaining JGi is tricky. In
this section, we describe our estimation algorithm, Estimate-GoodJR,
defined in Figure 1, Steps (e) - (g), and later prove its correctness in Section 3.
For any dynamic system, our analysis makes use of a disjoint period of
time called an epoch ; roughly, this is the duration of time until the system
membership of good IDs changes by a constant fraction.
Definition 1. Let Gi be the set of good IDs in the system at the end of epoch
i and let epoch 1 begin at system initialization. Then, epoch i is defined as
the shortest amount of time until |Gi − Gi−1| ≥ (3/4)|Gi|.
7
Figure 2: A depiction of the relationship between the good join rate in intervals,
epochs, and iterations. Arrows represent that good join rates are within constant
factors of each other. Green indicates the most recently-finished epoch and interval
being tracked by the committee to obtain J˜Gi .
Let ρj be the join rate of good IDs in epoch j; that is, the number of
good IDs that join in epoch j divided by the number of seconds in epoch j.
We define two assumptions, A1 and A2, on the join rate of good IDs
(not bad IDs). We let c(A, L) and c(A, U) be positive constants used to,
respectively, lower bound and upper bound a quantity pertaining to the
assumption A.
• Assumption A1. For all j > 1, c(A1, L) ρj−1 ≤ ρj ≤ c(A1, U) ρj−1.
• Assumption A2. For any period of time within epoch j that contains at
least 2 good join events, the good join rate during that period is between
c(A2, L) ρj and c(A2, U) ρj .
Informally, assumption A1 implies that the rate at which good IDs join does
not change by too much from one epoch to the next. assumption A2 implies
that two or more consecutive good join events cannot be too close or too
spread out. In Section 4.1, we give empirical evidence supporting these two
assumptions.
2.4 Description of Estimate-GoodJR
Estimate-GoodJR continually keeps track of the sets S˜, which is the most
recent system membership such that |Scur − S˜| ≥ 35 |Scur|, and Scur is the set
of IDs currently in the system. Whenever S˜ is updated — and only when S˜
is updated — the parameter ˜` is set to the length of time since the system
membership was most recently S˜, and we refer to this length of time as an
interval . Then, J˜Gi = |Scur|/˜` is used as an estimate for the true good join
rate over iteration i, denoted by JGi .
Our approach for estimating the good-ID join rate may be of independent
interest for other settings where Assumptions A1 and A2 hold. Therefore,
we provide intuition for why they are necessary.
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Since good and bad IDs cannot be distinguished with certainty, it is chal-
lenging to determine when an epoch begins and ends. Instead, Estimate-
GoodJR calculates a lower bound on the number of new good IDs that
have joined the system by pessimistically subtracting out the fraction of IDs
that could be bad. When this estimate of new good IDs is sufficiently large
— that is, when the current interval ends — Estimate-GoodJR “guesses”
that at least one epoch has occurred. However, multiple (but still a constant
number of) epochs may have actually occurred during this time. Thus, for
this approach to yield a constant-factor estimate of JGi , the true good join
rate cannot have changed “too much" between these epochs, and A1 bounds
the amount of such change.
Assumption A1 addresses the good join rate measured over entire, con-
secutive epochs. But, an interval may end within some epoch j. If the good
join rate over the portion of epoch j overlapped by the interval deviates by
more than a constant factor from ρj , then the estimate will be inaccurate.
Assumption A2 ensures that this cannot happen.
3 Theoretical Results
First, we prove that Estimate-GoodJR achieves a constant-factor approx-
imation, J˜Gi , to the good-ID join rate J
G
i (Theorem 1). Define “with high
probability” (w.h.p.) to mean with probability at least 1 − 1/nγ0 . All of
our arguments hold with high probability over the system lifetime, and they
rely on Assumptions A1 and A2. Due to space constraints, we include proofs
in AppendixA.
Theorem 1. For any iteration i ≥ 1, Estimate-GoodJR provides a constant-
factor estimate of the good-ID join rate:
c(JE, L)JGi ≤ J˜Gi ≤ c(JE, H)JGi
where c(JE, L) =
(
5
6
) c(A1, L)2c(A2, L)
c(A1, U)
and c(JE, H) =
5 c(A1, U)2c(A2, U)
c(A1, L)
.
The following theorem bounds the spend rate of ToGCom. We explicitly
include the constants from Assumptions A1 and A2.
Theorem 2. For α ≤ 1/18, w.h.p. over the system lifetime, ToGCom
maintains the Population and Committee invariants and ensures:
A ≤ 11d2
(
d1
√
2T (c(JE, H)JG + 1) + JG
)
where d1 =
√
2c(JE, H) and d2 =
(
12
11 +
c(A1, U)c(A2, U)
11c(JE, L)
)
.
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The proof of Theorem 2 differs considerably from that of GMCom [21]
(see Appendix A.2). We omit our arguments for the Population and Com-
mittee invariants, since those are unchanged from [21].
4 Experiments
We now report our empirical results. In Section 4.1, we test assumptions
A1 and A2 from Section 2.3. In section 4.2, we measure the computational
cost for ToGCom, as a function of the adversarial cost, and compare it
against prior PoW based algorithms. Finally, in Section 4.3, we propose and
implement several heuristics to improve the performance of ToGCom. All
our experiments were written in MATLAB.
Data Sets. Our experiments use data from the following networks:
1. Bitcoin: This dataset records the join and departure events of IDs
in the Bitcoin network, timestamped to the second, over roughly 7
days [40].
2. BitTorrent RedHat: This dataset simulates the join and departure
events for the BitTorrent network to obtain a RedHat ISO image. We
use the Weibull distribution with shape and scale parameters of 0.59
and 41.0, respectively, from [48].
3. Ethereum: This dataset simulates join and departure events of IDs for
the Ethereum network. Based on a study in [25], we use the Weibull
distribution with shape parameter of 0.52 and scale parameter of 9.8.
4. Gnutella: This dataset simulates join and departure events for the
Gnutella network. Based on a study in [45], we use an exponential
distribution with mean of 2.3 hours for session time, and Poisson dis-
tribution with mean of 1 ID per second for the arrival rate.
4.1 Testing Assumptions A1 and A2
Experimental Setup. For the Bitcoin network, the system starts with 9212
IDs, and the join and departure events are based on the dataset from [41].
For the other networks, we initialize the system with 1000 IDs, and simulate
the join and departure events over 1000 epochs. We assume all joining IDs
are good. Every value plotted is the mean of 20 independent runs.
To test Assumption A1, for each epoch i ≥ 2, the good join rate in epoch
i, ρi, is compared to the good join rate in the previous epoch, ρi−1. Results
are summarized in the columns labeled c(A1, L) and c(A1, U) of Table 1.
To test Assumption A2, for each epoch i ≥ 1, we consider all periods of
time containing at least 2 good joins events. In particular, we measure the
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minimum and maximum join rate for epoch i, denoted by ρmini and ρ
max
i ,
respectively, and compare these values against ρi. The results are presented
in Table 1. We have included the corresponding plots in Appendix A.4.
Network c(A1, L) c(A1, U) c(A2, L) c(A2, U)
Bitcoin 0.1 10 0.0005 30
BitTorrent RedHat 0.125 8 0.067 15
Ethereum Mainnet 0.5 2 0.4 2
Gnutella 0.5 2 0.1 4
Table 1: Constants Assumptions A1 and A2 for Section 4.1
4.2 Evaluating Computational Cost without Heuristics
We now measure the spend rate for ToGCom, focusing solely on the com-
putational cost of solving puzzles. Throughout, we assume a computational
cost of k for solving a puzzle of difficulty k. We compare the performance of
ToGCom against four PoW-based Sybil defense algorithms: GMCom [21],
CCom [20], SybilControl [26] and REMP (a name that uses the au-
thors’ initials) [44], summarized below.
GMCom. GMCom is like ToGCom, except for two differences. First, the
entrance cost is the maximum of 1, and the measured join rate in the current
iteration divided by an estimate of the good join rate. Second, the estimate
of the good join rate is computed via a different (incorrect) heuristic [21].
CCom. CCom is the same as ToGCom except the entrance cost is always
1.
SybilControl. Each ID solves a puzzle to join. Additionally, each ID
tests its neighbors with a puzzle every 5 seconds, removing from its list of
neighbors those IDs that fail to provide a solution within a fixed time period.
These tests are not coordinated between IDs.
REMP. Each ID solves a puzzle to join. Additionally, each ID must solve
puzzles every W seconds. We use Equation (4) from [44] to compute the
value of computational spending rate per ID as:
L
W
=
n
Nattacker
=
Tmax
αN
(1)
where L is the computational cost to an ID per W seconds, n is the number
of IDs that the adversary can add to the system and Nattacker is the total
number of attackers in the system. Suppose N is the system size, then
Nattacker is αN since the computational power with the adversary is an α
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fraction of computational power of the network in our model. Suppose Tmax
is the maximum number of attackers (bad IDs) that can join in W seconds,
then to guarantee that the fraction of bad IDs is less than half, n = Tmax.
Substituting these values in Equation 1, we can compute total algorithmic
spending rate as:
AREMP = (1− α)N × L
W
=
(1− α)Tmax
α
(2)
Setup. We assume the good IDs join and depart as described in Section 4.1.
We set α = 1/18, and let T range over [20, 230], where for each value of T ,
the system is simulated for 10, 000 seconds. We also simulate the case T = 0.
We assume that the adversary only solves puzzles to add IDs to the system.
For REMP, we consider two values of Tmax, 104 and 107. Setting Tmax = 107
ensures correctness for all values of T considered, and Tmax = 104 ensures
correctness for T ≤ 104.
Results. Figure 3 illustrates our results; we omit error bars since they are
negligible. The x-axis is the adversarial spending rate, T ; and the y-axis is
the algorithmic spending rate, A. We cut off the plots for REMP-104 and
SybilControl, when they can no longer ensure that the fraction of bad
IDs is less than 1/2. We also note that REMP-107 only ensures a minority
of bad IDs for up to T = 107.
ToGCom always has spend rate as low as the other algorithms for
T ≥ 100, and significantly less than the other algorithms for large T , with
improvements that grow to about 2 orders of magnitude. In Section 4.3, our
heuristics close this gap, allowing ToGCom to outperform all algorithms
for all T ≥ 0. The spend rate for ToGCom is linear in √T , agreeing with
our analytical results. We emphasize that the benefits of ToGCom are con-
sistent over four disparate networks. These results illustrate the value of
Estimate-GoodJR.
Finally, we note that ToGCom guarantees a fraction of bad IDs no
more than 1/6 for all values of T . In contrast, SybilControl and REMP
guarantee a fraction of bad IDs less than 1/2 for the values of T plotted.
For T ≥ 100, GMCom and CCom perform almost identically. This
occurs because of an error in the estimation heuristic of [21], which causes
GMCom to incorrectly estimate JG, when T is much larger than JG (JG ≈
10 in these plots). When the estimate is incorrect, by the specification in [21],
the entrance-puzzle hardness is set to 1, and so GMCom reverts to CCom.
Our simulations in [21] assumed knowledge of the good join rate, and thus
did not reveal the flaw in GMCom’s estimation method.
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Figure 3: Algorithmic cost versus adversarial cost for ToGCom, GMCom,
CCom, SybilControl and REMP.
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Figure 4: Algorithmic cost versus adversarial cost for ToGCom and heuris-
tics.
4.3 Heuristics
Next, we present heuristics to improve the performance of ToGCom. To
determine effective heuristics, we focus on two separate costs to good IDs:
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entrance cost and purge cost. In studying these costs for the Bitcoin network
in the absence of an attack, we find that the purge cost dominates and,
therefore, we focus on reducing the purge frequency.
Heuristic 1: We use the symmetric difference to determine when to do a
purge. Specifically, for iteration i, if |(Scur∪Si−1)−(Scur∩Si−1)| ≥ |Si−1|/11,
then a purge is executed. This ensures that the fraction of bad IDs can
increase by no more than in our original specification. Also, it decreases the
purge frequency: for example, in the case when some ID joins and departs
repeatedly.
Heuristic 2: We use the estimated good-ID join rate, obtained via Estimate-
GoodJR, to bound the maximum number of bad IDs that can have joined
during an iteration. This allows us to upper-bound the fraction of bad IDs
in the system and to purge only when the population invariant is at risk.
Heuristic 3: Recent works have explored the possibility of identifying bad
IDs based on the network topology [13, 34]. In our experiments, we focus
on SybilFuse [13], which has the probability of correctly classifying an ID as
either good or bad as 0.92 and 0.98 based on the empirical results from [13],
Section IV-B, last paragraph. We assume these values hold and use SybilFuse
to diagnose whether a joining ID is good or bad; in the latter case, the ID is
refused entry.
We evaluate the performance of these heuristics against ToGCom. The
experimental setup is the same as Section 4.2. We defineTGCH to beToG-
Com using both Heuristic 1 and Heuristic 2. We define TGCH-SF(92) and
TGCH-SF(98) to be ToGCom using Heuristics 1 and 2, and also Heuristic
3, with the accuracy parameter of Heuristic 3 as 0.98 and 0.92.
Figure 4 illustrates our results. Note that TGCH-SF(92) and TGCH-
SF(98) reduce costs significantly during adversarial attack, with improve-
ments of up to three orders of magnitude during the most significant attack
tested. Again, these improvements are consistent across 4 different types of
data sets.
5 Related Work
There is large body of literature on defending against the Sybil attack [10];
for example, see surveys [23, 36, 42], and additional work documenting real-
world Sybil attacks [39, 50, 54]. To the best of our knowledge, CCom [20]
and GMCom [21] are the first defenses where the algorithmic spend rate
grows slowly with the adversarial spend rate.
Domain-Specific Defenses. While PoW-based defenses work in general
network settings, domain-specific results for mitigating the Sybil attack have
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been discovered. In a wireless network with multiple communication chan-
nels, Sybil attacks can be mitigated via radio-resource testing which re-
lies on the inability of the adversary to listen to many channels simulta-
neously [17, 18, 37]. However, this approach may fail if the adversary can
monitor most or all of the channels. Furthermore, even in the absence of
attack, radio-resource testing requires testing at fixed intervals.
Social Network Properties. Several results that leverage social networks
for Sybil resistance [35,53,55]. However, social-network information may not
be available in many settings. Another idea is to use network measurements
to verify the uniqueness of IDs [15, 28, 47], but these techniques rely on
accurate measurements of latency, signal strength, or round-trip times, for
example, and this may not always be possible. Containment strategies are
explored in overlays [9, 46], but these results do not ensure a bound on the
fraction of bad IDs.
Proof of Work and Alternatives. As a choice for PoW, computational
puzzles provide certain advantages. First, verifying a solution is much easier
than solving the puzzle itself. This places the burden of proof on devices
that wish to participate in a protocol rather than on a verifier. In contrast,
bandwidth-oriented schemes, such as [49], require verification of sufficient
number of packets being received before any service is provided; this requires
effort by the verifier that is proportional to the number of packets.
A recent alternative to PoW is proof-of-stake (PoS) where security
relies on the adversary holding a minority stake in an abstract finite re-
source [1]. When making a group decision, PoS weights each participant’s
vote using its share of a limited resource; for example, the amount of cryp-
tocurrency held by the participant. A well-known example is ALGORAND [16],
which employs PoS to form a committee. A hybrid approach using both PoW
and PoS has been proposed in the Ethereum system [2].
6 Conclusion
We have presented and analyzed ToGCom, which proposes a novel method
for setting the entrance-puzzle difficulty, and for estimating the good-ID join
rate. Additionally, we obtained a tight analysis of the asymmetric property.
Our proposed heuristics further improve performance, and experiments show
that ToGCom decreases computational cost to the good IDs compared to
other PoW-based Sybil defenses.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We say that interval ˜` touches an epoch if there is a point in time belonging
to both the interval ˜` and the interval of time corresponding to the epoch;
it does not necessarily mean that ` completely contains the epoch, or vice
versa.
In this section, for any time t, let St and Gt denote the set of all IDs and
set of good IDs, respectively, in the system at time t.
Lemma 1. An interval touches at most two epochs and cannot completely
overlap any single epoch.
Proof. Assume that some interval starts at time t0 and touches at least three
epochs; we will derive a contradiction. This assumption implies that there is
at least one epoch entirely contained within the interval. Consider the first
such epoch, and let it start at time t1 ≥ t0 and end at time t2 > t1. Observe
that:
|St2 − St1 | ≥ |Gt2 − Gt1 | ≥
3
4
|Gt2 | ≥
(
5
6
)(
3
4
)
|St2 | =
5
8
|St2 | >
3
5
|St2 |
where step 2 holds by by the definition of an epoch and step 3 by the Popu-
lation Invariant. But this is a contradiction since it implies that the interval
must end before time t2.
The following lemma considers any interval, i, of length ˜`, where there
are |Scur| IDs in the system at the end of the interval. By the Population
Invariant, the number of good IDs in the system is always at least (5/6)|Scur|
. Hence, |Scur|˜` is within constant factors of the good join rate during the
interval.
Thus, the next lemma shows that the estimate set by the algorithm in
interval i, J˜Gi (=
|Scur|
˜` ), is within constant factors of the good join rate during
interval i. (See Figure 2).
Lemma 2. Consider any interval i ≥ 1, and let epoch j be the most recent
epoch that the interval touches. Then:(
5
6
)
c(A1, L)c(A2, L)ρj ≤ J˜Gi ≤ 5c(A1, U)c(A2, U)ρj .
Proof. Let interval i be of length ˜`, and assume there are |Scur| IDs in the
system at the end of the interval i. Then J˜Gi =
|Scur|
˜` . There are three cases.
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Case 1: Interval i touches only a single epoch where the epoch begins at t0,
the interval begins at t1, and the interval ends at t2. By assumption A2, we
have:
c(A2, L)ρj ≤ |Gt2 − Gt1 |
t2 − t1 ≤ c(A2, U)ρj
and by the Population Invariant and the specification of an interval:(
2
5
)
|St2 | ≤
(
3
5
− 1
6
)
|St2 | ≤ |Gt2 − Gt1 | ≤
(
3
5
)
|St2 |.
Therefore, we have:(
5
3
)
c(A2, L)ρj ≤ |St2 |
t2 − t1 ≤
(
5
2
)
c(A2, U)ρj
Case 2: The interval touches epochs i − 1 and i and there are at least 2
good ID join events in each epoch. Let epoch i− 1 start at time t0 and end
at t2 (and so epoch i starts at t2), and let the interval start at time t1 ≥ t0
and end at t3 ≥ t2. By Assumptions A1 and A2, we have:
c(A1, L)c(A2, L)ρj ≤ |Gt3 − Gt1 |
t3 − t1 ≤ c(A1, U)c(A2, U)ρj
and by the Population Invariant and the specification of an interval:(
2
5
)
|St3 | ≤
(
3
5
− 1
6
)
|St3 | ≤ |Gt3 − Gt1 | ≤
(
3
5
)
|St3 |.
Therefore, we have:(
5
3
)
c(A1, L)c(A2, L)ρj≤ |St3 |
t3 − t1 ≤
(
5
2
)
c(A1, U)c(A2, U)ρj
which we refer to as the Case-2 Equation.
Case 3: The interval touches epochs j − 1 and j, and w.l.o.g. we have a
single good join event in the portion of epoch j−1 that overlaps the interval;
denote the length of this overlap by λ′ > 0. As with Case 2, let epoch j − 1
start at time t0 and end at t2 (and so epoch j starts at t2), and let the
interval start at time t1 ≥ t0 and end at t3 ≥ t2.
Observe that the single good join event in epoch j − 1 increases the
numerator of the bounded quantity in the Case-2 Equation by 1, and so
twice the upper bound in Case 2 suffices here. The denominator increases
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by λ′, where λ′ ≤ t3 − t1, so half the lower bound in Case 2 suffices. This
implies: (
5
6
)
c(A1, L)c(A2, L)ρj ≤ |St3 |
t3 − t1 ≤ 5c(A1, U)c(A2, U)ρj
Lemma 3. For any epoch j ≥ 1, and any iteration i ≥ 1 that epoch j
touches:
c(A1, L)JGi ≤ ρj ≤ c(A1, U)JGi
Proof. By Lemma 1, iteration j touches at most two epochs, say epochs j−1
and j. Thus, by definition of JGi , for some λ1, λ2 ≥ 0, λ1 + λ2 = 1:
JGi = λ1ρj−1 + λ2ρj ≤ λ1
(
ρj
c(A1, L)
)
+ λ2ρj ≤ ρj
c(A1, L)
The second step above holds by assumption A1. The last step holds since
λ1+λ2 = 1 and c(A1, L) ≤ 1. A similar derivation yields that JGi ≥ ρjc(A1, U) .
Together this implies that: c(A1, L)JGi ≤ ρj ≤ c(A1, U)JGi .
We can now prove Theorem 1, restate below.
Theorem 1. For any iteration i ≥ 1, Estimate-GoodJR provides a constant-
factor estimate of the good-ID join rate:
c(JE, L)JGi ≤ J˜Gi ≤ c(JE, H)JGi
where c(JE, L) =
(
5
6
) c(A1, L)2c(A2, L)
c(A1, U)
and c(JE, H) =
5 c(A1, U)2c(A2, U)
c(A1, L)
.
Proof. The estimate J˜Gi used in iteration i corresponds to the most recent
interval that completed before iteration i started. Let epoch j be the most
recent epoch that touches this interval. By Lemma 2:(
5
6
)
c(A1, L)c(A2, L)ρj ≤ J˜Gi ≤ 5 c(A1, U)c(A2, U)ρj .
Epoch j may end prior to the start of iteration i; that is, epoch j may not
necessarily touch iteration i. In this case, note that by Lemma 1, the current
interval touches epoch j + 1 and must end before epoch j + 1 ends. This
fact, along with the observation that the current interval touches iteration
i, implies that epoch j + 1 touches iteration i.
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By the above, we know that either epoch j+1 or epoch j touches iteration
i. Lemma 3 implies:
c(A1, L)JGi ≤ ρj ≤ c(A1, U)JGi
or
c(A1, L)JGi ≤ ρj+1 ≤ c(A1, U)JGi .
To employ our top-most equation, we use A1 to derive:
ρj+1/c(A1, U) ≤ ρj ≤ ρj+1/c(A1, L)
and then plug into our top-most equation, we have:(
5
6
)
c(A1, L)2c(A2, L)
c(A1, U)
JGi ≤ J˜Gi ≤
5 c(A1, U)2c(A2, U)
c(A1, L)
JGi
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We make use of the following algebraic fact that follows from the Cauchy-
Schwartz inequality.
Lemma 4. Let n be a positive number, and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, si ≥ 0 and let
S =
∑n
i=1 si. Then
n∑
i=1
s2i ≥ S2/n
Proof. Let u be a vector of length n with for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, u[i] = si, and
let v be a vector of length n with, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, v[i] = 1. Then by
Cauchy-Schwartz:
|〈u, v〉|2 ≤ 〈u, u〉 · 〈v, v〉
S2 ≤
(
n∑
i=1
s2i
)
· n
Rearranging completes the proof.
Let Ti denote the cost to the adversary over iteration i divided by the length
of iteration i. Let JBi be the join rate of bad IDs during iteration i. Recall
that c(JE, H)JGi =
5c(A1, U)2c(A2, U)
c(A1, L) .
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Lemma 5. For any iteration i > 1,
JBi ≤ d1
√
Ti(JGi + 1)
where d1 =
√
2c(JE, H).
Proof. For simplicity, we normalize time units so that `i = 1. Partition
iteration i from left to right into sub-iterations, all of length 1/J˜Gi , except
the last, which is of length at most 1/J˜Gi . We lower bound the cost paid
by the adversary for joins by pessimistically assuming that only bad IDs
are counted when computing entrance costs. For 1 ≤ x ≤ dJ˜Gi e, let jx be
the total number of bad IDs that join in sub-iteration x. Since
∑jx
y=1 y =
(jx + 1)jx/2 ≥ (jx)2/2, the total entrance cost paid by bad IDs is at least
(1/2)
∑dJ˜Gi e
x=1 (jx)
2.
zSince
∑dJ˜Gi e
x=1 jx = J
B
i , by applying Lemma 4, we have:
Ti ≥ 1
2
dJ˜Gi e∑
x=1
(jx)
2 ≥ (J
B
i )
2
2(dJ˜Gi e)
Cross-multiplying and taking the square root, we get:
JBi ≤
√
2TidJ˜Gi e ≤
√
2Ti(J˜Gi + 1) ≤
√
2Ti
(
c(JE, H)JGi + 1
)
where the second step follows from noting that dxe ≤ x+ 1 for all x, and the
final step follows from Lemma 1 which states that:
J˜Gi ≤
5c(A1, U)2c(A2, U)
c(A1, L)
JGi = c(JE, H)J
G
i
which yields the lemma statement.
Lemma 6. Let Ai be the average spend rate for the algorithm in any iteration
i > 1. Then, Ai ≤ d2|Si−1|`i , where d2 =
(
12
11 +
c(A1, U)c(A2, U)
11c(JE,L)
)
.
Proof. For simplicity, we first normalize time units so that `i = 1. Partition
iteration i from left to right into sub-iterations, all of length 1/JGi , except
the last, which is of length at most 1/JGi .
The spend rate for the algorithm due to purge costs is |Si−1|.
For entrance costs, note the following two facts. First, by Assumptions
A1 and A2, there are at most c(A1, U)c(A2, U) good IDs in any sub-iteration
(note that a sub-iteration might span two epochs). Second, the entrance
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cost for any good ID is 1 plus the number of join events over the past 1/J˜Gi
seconds. By Theorem 1, 1/J˜Gi ≤ 1/(c(JE, L)JGi ), and so the entrance cost
is at most 1 plus the number of join events over the past 1/c(JE, L) sub-
iterations; that is 1 + c(A1, U)c(A2, U)/c(JE, L).
By these two facts, and by the fact that there are at most |Si−1|/11 join
events in an iteration, the total entrance costs paid by good IDs in iteration
i is at most: (
1 +
c(A1, U)c(A2, U)
c(JE, L)
)( |Si−1|
11
)
.
Adding the bounds for both entrance and purge costs and dividing by
the value of `i yields a total cost of at most:
|Si−1|
`i
(
12
11
+
c(A1, U)c(A2, U)
11c(JE, L)
)
Let I be any subset of iterations that for integers x and y, 1 ≤ x ≤ y,
contains every iteration with index between x and y inclusive. Let δ(I) be
|Sx − Sy|; and let ∆(I) be δ(I) divided by the length of I. Let AI and TI
be the algorithmic and adversarial spend rates over I; and let JGI be the
good join rate over all of I. Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 7. For any subset of contiguous iterations, I,which starts after
iteration 1, the algorithmic spending rate over I is at most:
11d2
(
2∆(I) + d1
√
2TI(c(JE, H)JGI + 1) + J
G
I
)
.
Proof. Let Di be the departure rate of both good and bad IDs during itera-
tion i. By Lemma 6 and the assumptions for when a purge occurs, we have
that:∑
i∈I
Ai`i ≤ d2
∑
i∈I
|Si−1|
≤ 11d2
∑
i∈I
(Di + J
B
i + J
G
i )`i
≤ 11d2
(
2δ(I) +
√∑
i∈I
2Ti`i
∑
i∈I
(c(JE, H)JGi + 1)`i +
∑
i∈I
JGi `i
)
The second line in the above follows from the fact that every ID that
departs must have departed from the set of IDs in the system at the start of
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I or else must have been an ID that joined during I. The last line follows
from the Lemma 5 bound on JBi , and noting that `i =
√
`2i . Finally, the
last line follows from Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality.
Dividing both sides of the above inequality by
∑
i∈I `i and recalling that
d1 =
√
2c(JE, H), completes the proof.
The above result is more general than we need, but Theorem 2 follows
from Lemma 7 by noting that ∆(I) = 0 when I is all iterations, since
the system is initially empty. We state an interesting corollary implied by
Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. For α ≤ 1/18, with error probability polynomially small in n0
over the system lifetime, and for any subset of contiguous iterations I, ToG-
Com has an algorithmic spending rate of O
(√
TI (JGI + 1) + ∆(I) + JGI
)
.
This shows that the spending rate for the algorithm remains small, even when
focusing on just a subset of iterations. To understand why this is important,
consider a long-lived system which suffers a single, significant attack for a
small number of iterations, after which there are no more attacks. The cost
of any defense may be small when amortized over the lifetime of the system,
but this does not give a useful guarantee on performance during the time of
attack.
A.3 GMCom with close Join Events
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Figure 5: Comparison of algorithmic
spend rate for CCom and GMCom as
join event grows closer to beginning of an
epoch.
Experimetal Setup. We simulate
CCom and GMCom over a system
that always consists of 10, 000 good
IDs. During the lifetime of the sys-
tem, new good IDs join/depart at
a constant rate of one ID per time
step. The departing ID is chosen
uniformly at random from the set of
IDs that joined before the current it-
eration. We run for 2 iterations and
then have a single join event in the
third iteration. This last join event
occurs arbitrarily close to second to
last join event which ended the pre-
vious iteration.
Let the time between the second to last and the last join event be 1/X,
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for some value X > 0. Thus, as X increases, these two last join events
become closer together. For X ∈ {20, 21, ..., 230}, we compute the spend rate
for CCom and GMCom.
Figure 5 illustrates our results. As can be seen, as X increases, the algo-
rithmic spend rate, A, increases linearly for GMCom, whereas for CCom it
remains constant. This increase in the spend rate for GMCom occurs solely
because of the increasing entrance cost for the very last good join event.
A.4 Plots from Experiments of Section 4.1
In Figure 6, we present the plots from our experiments testing Assumptions
A1 and A2. These are used to derive the values presented in Table 1.
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Figure 6: Testing Assumptions A1 and A2 for (a) & (b) Bitcoin Network,
(c) & (d) BitTorrent Redhat, (e) & (f) Ethereum Network, and (g) & (h)
Gnutella Network.
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